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ExECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of 
$51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000 
expenditures. The five-year moving average of arms 
transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from 
2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004. 1 These figures 
and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin 
America is engaged in an arms race. Other reasons, 
however, account for Latin America's large military 
expenditure. Among them: 
• 
• 
• 
Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged 
modernization efforts, recently made possible by six 
years of consistent regional growth. 2 
A generational shift is at hand. Armed Forces are 
beginning to shed the stigma and association with past 
dictatorial regimes. 3 
Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies, 
rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For 
example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its 
Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia's 
spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and 
Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the 
1990s.4 
1 Bromley, Mark, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends 
and Implications of Military Expeoditures in South America," Brookings 
hlstitution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pgs. 12, 13, 
and 16 
2 Robledo, Marcos, .. The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power 
Point presentation, Slide 18,2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, 
Miemi, Flurida, May 25"- 26", 2010 
3 Y opo, Boris, '"l,Carrera Annamentista en 1a Regi6n?" La Tercera, November 
2"', 2009, <http://www.latercera.com/contertide/895 197084 9.shtml>, accessed 
October 8"', 2010 - -
4 Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Treads aod 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings hlstitution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pgs. 49, 50, 53 aod 54 
1 
Concerns remain, however: Venezuela continues to 
demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of 
transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and 
Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must 
all continue to be monitored; and Brazil's military purchases, 
although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation 
of eqnipment.5 
These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and 
garnering greater participation in transparent procurement 
mechanisms.6 The United States can do its part by 
supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the 
transparency process. 
5 Ibid., Guevara, Jiiigo, Pg. 22 
6 Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. I 8 and I 9 
2 
THE ONGOING QUESTION 
Since the Central American wars of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Oscar Arias Sanchez, Costa Rica's two-time president and 
1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has closely monitored arms 
acquisitions and military expenditure in Latin America. In 
1997 he advocated for an International Code of Conduct on 
Arms Transfers, designed to place specific restrictions on 
arms-producing countries.7 In September of 2009, he 
regretfully informed the United Nations General Assembly 
that Latin America was spending approximately "165 million 
dollars a day on weapons and soldiers."8 And in May of 
2010, he asserted that, "Despite the euphemisms that are 
used to conceal it, Latin America has begun a new arms race, 
fueled by ideological debates and the institutional weakness 
of our democracies."9 
These latest comments have understandably caused concern, 
and even some confusion, amongst policy circles. After all, 
Arias' comments came just weeks after those of Dr. Frank 0. 
Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, who said, "I do not believe that 
there is an arms race brewing ... the region has made strides 
in increasing transparency and creating mechanisms of 
defense and security cooperation through the development of 
regional institutions ... " 10 Prior to this, he had explained that 
Latin American arms purchases were ''most likely aimed at 
7 Whitney, Joel, "Oscar Arias Sanchez," Guemica, May 2005, 
<http://www .guernicamag.com/interviews/3 6/oscar _arias_ snchezl>, areessed 
Sep.20"',2010 
8 Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Sqnander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly: General Debate, New York, 
September 24"', 2009 
9 
"6scar Arias dennncia carrera armarcentista de America Latina," Ellmparcial, 
May 21•, 2010, 
<http://www.elimparcial.com!EdicionEnLinea!Notaslinternacional/21052010144 
8392.aspx>, accessed September 21", 2010 
10 Mora, Frank 0., "The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the 
Americaa," Pg. 7, University of Miami, April29"', 2010 
3 
modernizing military equipment that [hadn't] been upgraded 
over the past 30 or 40 years."11 
'Who then, is correct?' one is left asking. Is an arms race 
actually occurring? And if not, what have been the reasons 
for increased military spending in the region? In May of 
2008, The Economist also attributed the region's military 
spending to modernization, to "more normal relations 
between civilian governments and their armies," and to 
commodity-driven economic growth. 12 Others claimed that, 
"very real security concerns [were] being neglected," and 
that therefore new spending attempted to address them. 13 
However, do these various explanations hold true today? 
Furthermore, if countries are indeed modernizing their 
national militaries, "When do those legitimate modernization 
concerns end and when does the acquisition process 
constitute a threat?" one observer has asked.14 
In an attempt to answer these lingering questions, regional 
experts gathered on June 3rd, 2010, at a Brookings Institution 
and Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) co-
hosted event entitled, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? 
Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military 
Expenditures in South America." Many of their responses 
are highlighted within this report. 
11 Oppenheimer, Andres, "Despite Crisis, Latin Countries' Military Spending 
Rising," The Miami Herald, September 12"', 2009, 
<http://www.ihavenet.com/I..atin-Countries-Military-Spending-Rlsing-Andres-
Oppenheimor.httnl>, accessed September 27"', 2010 
12 
"Speak Fmteroally But Carry a Stick; South American Defense," The 
Economist, May 31", 2008 
13 Downie, Andrew, "Is Latin America Heading for an Arms Race?" The 
Christian Science Monitor, January 161h, 2008, 
<http:/ /www.csmooitor.com/W orld/ Americas/2008/0116/p07s01-woam.httnl>, 
accessed September 27"', 2010 
14 Downie, Richard, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Treods 
and hnplications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings 
hlstitotion Cooference, Washington, D.C., Juoe 3"', 2010, Tmoscript Pg. 4 
4 
CONCERNING FIGURES 
According to Mark Bromley, a researcher from Sweden's 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
South American military spending reached $51.8 billion in 
2009. "This was a 7.6 percent increase on the 2008 figure 
and a 50 percent rise on the 2000 amount," he says. "The 
rate of increase that we've seen over the past decade is 
almost double what it was in the previous ten years," he 
continues, with Brazil, 
Latin American military expenditure 1988-2009 
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• South America 
Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Uruguay standing 
out as the six biggest spenders. 15 (See Appendices I and II 
for individual country expenditure and major arms 
suppliers). From 2003 to 2008 alone, reports London's 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (llSS~, Latin 
America's overall military spending rose 91 percent. 6 
15 Ibid, Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 12 and 13 
16 Yopo, Boris, "j,Carrera Armam.entista en 1a Regi6n?" La Tercera, November 
2"", 2009, <http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895_197084_9.shtml>, accessed 
October 81h, 2010 
5 
As for arms imports, Bromley says, "Transfers of arms to 
South America were 150 percent higher in the period 2005 to 
2009 than they were in 2000 to 2004," according to a five-
year moving average. "This rise in transfers," he says, 
"exceeds the rise in transfers to Southeast Asia and North 
Africa, two other areas where the specter of potential arms 
races has been raised in recent years. In Southeast Asia, 
arms imports have risen by nearly 100 percent, while m 
North Africa, transfers have gone up by 60 percent."17 
MODERNIZATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND GLOBAL 
COMPARISONS 
During the aforementioned Brookings Institution/CHDS 
event, Ifugo Guevara from Mexico's Colectivo de Anii.lisis 
para Ia Seguridad con Democracia (CASEDE) explained 
that Latin American countries are indeed continuing to 
modernize their militaries, and that the high costs described 
above are simply inherent to the process. For example, 
"several countries are appra1smg their front-line 
conventional infantries" and replacing inventories from the 
1970s and 1990s, he said. "[And] conventional weapons," 
which he described as jets, tanks, armor, artillery, 
submarines, and surface ships, "are considerably expensive, 
especially the new generation of networked fighting 
machines." Therefore the high sums of $50 billion and 
beyond can be attributed to modernization costs, rather than 
an arms race. Furthermore, an arms race requires an "action-
reaction mechanism" that is largely absent in Latin America. 
In other words, countries would need to be continuously 
striving to both match and then significantly surpass the 
spending and acquisitions of their neighbors, and he does not 
see this happening. 18 
17 Bromley, Mark, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing !he Trends 
and hnplicationB of Military Expenditures in Soolh America," Brookings 
Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pg. 16 
18 Ibid, Guevara, Ifiigo, Pgs. 21 and 22 
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At the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium in 
Miami, Marcos Robledo from Chile’s Fundación Dialoga , 
affirmed that Latin America’s recent economic success has 
provided countries with the means to fund modernization 
aspirations and new defense strategies.  Prior to the U.S. 
financial crisis, he says, the region experienced six years of 
consistent growth, assisted strongly by nearly a decade of 
high commodity prices.  This granted Venezuela oil-
generated growth despite economic mismanagement, and 
hastened Brazil’s long-term trek to global stardom.  As for 
Chile, it has managed to maintain 5 percent GDP growth for 
a total of twenty years.19   
 
Beyond these new funding abilities, however, Ray Walser of 
the Heritage Foundation is wary to dub new spending and 
acquisitions as an arms race, primarily because “the numbers 
on a global scale don’t really tend to add up.”  For example, 
when Brazil’s arms expenditures are placed within the global 
context, it “only makes the top fifteen nations,” he says; and 
on a per capita basis, it ranks 88th.20  Robledo makes a 
similar global comparison, explaining that in 2007, Latin 
American resources dedicated to military expenditure were 
equivalent to lower than 1.5 percent of the region’s overall 
GDP, as opposed to expenditure in the Middle East/North 
Africa and the United States, which ran at approximately 5 
percent and just over 4.5 percent, respectively.  While his 
data does also show that Colombian and Chilean expenditure 
during the same year ran at roughly 4 percent and 3.5 percent 
of GDP, respectively, such figures can be attributed to the 
                                                 
19 Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power 
Point presentation, Slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, 
Miami, Florida, May 25th – 26th, 2010 
20 Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere?  Discussing the Trends and 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 47 and 48 
fact that both countries incorporate their national police 
forces into their military budgets, Guevara has explained. 21 
Therefore, neither Walser nor Robledo perceive an 
abnormality in Latin American defense spending vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world. And because Robledo believes the 
region's communication- i.e. transparency mechanisms- on 
individual country defense plans has improved, he finds that 
there is "no evidence of [a] regional rearmament; military 
acquisitions [have] related to different country rationale, not 
regional.',n 
Overall, Ray Walser attributes spending and acquisitions to a 
changing Latin America (encompassing both the 
modernization and economic developments described above, 
we can assume), less U.S. engagement and influence, and 
finally, to ideology and leadership approach. However, he 
also reaffirms Robledo's assertion: that beyond these general 
explanations, each country is following an independent, 
individuallogic.23 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY RATIONALE: BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, 
AND CHILE 
BRAZIL: Brazil has offered several explanations for its own 
military ambitions. First and foremost, it intends to protect 
the reaches of its huge Amazon rainforests. Therefore, "the 
number of border posts where troops will be stationed will 
be increased," reports The Economist, "and still more 
soldiers will be trained in the art of jungle warfare." The 
21 Robledo, Marcos, "The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power 
Point presentation, Slides 12, and 13, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security 
Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25"'- 26", 2010; and consultations with lfiigo 
Guevara, October 2010 
22 1bi<i, Robledo, Slides 9- 11 and 27 
23 Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends aod 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, TI'Slll!cript Pgs. 49 and SO 
8 
next priority is to guard the country's prized offshore oil 
finds, made possible by the purchase of four Sco:rpene 
submarines from France, and by plans to develop a nuclear 
attack submarine.24 And on September 9th, 2010, Deputy 
Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Gerson 
Menandro Garcia de Freitas, indicated that another "strategic 
purpose" of the Brazilian army was to safeguard the country 
during the upcoming FIFA World Cup in 2014, and the 
Olympic Games in 2016.25 
The Economist has questioned the necessity of some of these 
measures, but not because it opposes Brazilian military 
modernization. In fact, it says that Brazil's army "has 
changed surprisingly little since it ran the country in a 
dictatorship lasting from 1964 to 1985. . . [And] with 
democracy firmly established, it needs to find a new job". 
Rather, the magazine states that Brazil's anny would be put 
to better use by continuing to pursue international 
peacekeeping missions. This, too, would facilitate 
modernization, they say, impJtng that it would be a 
responsible method of doing so. 2 
Finally, it has been suggested that Brazil's peacekeeping 
forces are sent across the world as a means to further the 
country's image.27 Ray Walser would probably agree with 
this, as he has suggested that Brazil might be pursuing each 
of its military strategies - including plans to address local 
violence and transnational organized crime threats - to gain 
"greater weight to carry to the international table. "28 
24 Brands, Hal, "Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy," Pg. 13, Strategic 
Studies Institute, August2010 
""What is Brazil's Army For?" The Economis~ September 9"', 2010 
26 lbid; See also, "Policy, Not Altruism: How Global AmbitionB are Helping to 
Modernize the Army," The Economist, September 23"', 2010 
27 Ibid 
28 Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, TI'lllll!cript Pgs. 53 and 54 
9 
COLOMBIA: Walser explains that Colombia's military 
doctrine and acquisition system were forged by its response 
to domestic threats of the two main guerrilla groups - the 
F ARC and ELN - as well as paramilitaries and drug-
trafficking cartels. 29 This type of military buildup was 
widely supported by society - says Adam Isacson, a Senior 
Associate for the Washington Office for Latin America- and 
ultimately led to the country's current defense budget, which 
is three times that of 2000. More recently, however, 
Colombia has cast concerned eyes on neighboring 
Venezuela, explains Isacson. "Chavez's rhetoric and 
purchases have had an impact on [Colombian] debate ... in 
the media and in official circles, you do increasingly hear 
talk about a possible threat from Venezuela against which 
Colombia must prepare."3° For example, after Venezuela 
attained twenty-four Sukhoi fighters, Colombia's Air Force 
wished to respond by obtaining a set ofF -16s, says Guevara; 
yet in the end, the Colombian government decided instead to 
purchase 13 Kfu fighter jets, to update the 11 Kfrr fighters 
already owned (which dated back to the 1980s), and to 
employ them in the fight against insurgencies.31 
CHILE: Julio Soto, a professor at the National Academy of 
Political and Strategic Studies in Santiago, says his country's 
defense policy consists of two elements: "national security 
achieved mainly by deterrence and international cooperation. 
Nevertheless, "he continues, ''we think that the core of our 
defense is based on the modernization processes of our 
defense institutions (in effect since the 1990s); second, in 
regional cooperation on defense and security issues; and 
finally, in our contributions to the international environment 
of peace and security."32 
29 lbid., Pg. 51 
30 Ibid., lsacson, Adam, Pgs. 62 and 66 
31 Consultation with liligo Guevara, October 2010 
Solo, Julio, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Tralll!cript Pgs. 74 and 75 
10 
At the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, 
Robledo explained that Chile's defense spending has 
remained consistent and level from 1990 to 2008; that its 
long-term military expenditure has actually decreased from 
the 1970s onward; that its active military has consistently 
shrunk since 1990; and fmally, that within the past nine 
years, many armed forces materials have been replaced 
rather than increased. 33 
ARIAS SANCHEZ REVISITED 
All of these general and country-specific explanations seem 
to call Arias' arms race concerns into question. Also 
questionable is the following assertion he made before the 
United Nations in 2009: "Jn Latin America, and in a 
substantial portion of the developing world, armies have not 
served any purpose [other] than to carry out a coup d'etat. "34 
Within only months of his statement, Latin American 
militaries were utilized to play key roles in disaster-relief 
efforts. For example, in the wake of Chile's 8.8-magnitude 
earthquake, 10,000 troops were deployed to successfully 
quell disorder and wide~read looting in the country's Bio-
Bio and Maule regions. And in the aftermath of Haiti's 
massive earthquake, "U.S., Colombian, and Brazilian 
[military] personnel - in conjunction with many others -
worked side-by-side to deliver life-saving relief to the 
Haitian people," Mr. Mora has explained ?6 
33 Robledo, Marcos, .. The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power 
Point presentation, Slides 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and26, 2010 WestemHe:misphere 
Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25"- 26", 20 I 0 
34 Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth 
Session of the United Nations Goo oral Asserchly: General Debate, New Y ark, 
September 24", 2009 
35 
"Counting the Cost; Chile's Earthquake," The Economist, March 6"', 2010 
36 Mara, Frank 0., "The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the 
Ameticas," Pg. 7, University of Miami, April29"', 2010 
11 
 Yet one of the primary drivers behind most of Arias' 
statements is the belief that the region's resources would be 
put to better use if military spending was re-directed towards 
poverty alleviation, education and vaccination provision, 
environmental rehabilitation, etc., particularly in a region 
where he says one-third of population faces poverty. 37 And 
on this front, he has recently received strong support from 
Dr. Kevin Casas-Zamora, a Brookings Institution fellow and 
former Vice President of Costa Rica, who says that Latin 
An3erica' s current levels of military expenditure are 
detrimental to the region's economic development. It may 
not be apparent when we compare Latin An3erica's military 
expenditure to that of the rest of the world; but when other 
comparisons are made, he says, such as military spending to 
levels of taxation, and military spending to investment in 
education, the story is different. "It turns out that military 
expenditure in South An3erica is a higher proportion of tax 
revenue and education expenditure than anywhere else in the 
world," he says, "with the predictable exception of North 
Africa and the Middle East. Even sub-Saharan Africa fares 
better when we place military spending under this light. 
Simply put, in the low taxation context that is pervasive in 
Latin An3erica, military expenditure does compete with the 
scarce resources for development." Economics laureate 
Lawrence Kline has corroborated these findings, 
demonstrating that reductions in Guatemalan military 
expenditure from 1968 to 1994 resulted in not only greater 
overall GDP, but also improved household consumption.38 
Finally, to gain even greater insight into both, Arias' 
comments and the overall expenditures phenomenon at large, 
37 Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth 
Session of the United Nations Geoersl Asserobly: Geoerol Debate, New York, 
Septerober 24", 2009 
38 Casas-Zamora, Kevin, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the 
Treods and hnplications of Military Exponditu:res in South America," Brookings 
Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transeript Pgs. 101 
and 102 
12 
Arias' individual experience and generation must be 
juxtaposed with that of the shift in perception that has 
recently occurred in Latin America. For example, Arias 
acted as the key negotiator in Central America's 1987 peace 
accord, and his generation was witness to decades of South 
American military dictatorships. Yet increases in regional 
military expenditure today, says Chilean academic and 
former ambassador Boris Y opo, have occurred "above all, 
[because Latin America] is beginning to shed the stigma and 
association of the Armed Forces with past dictatorial 
regimes, causing policy and societal constraints to disappear, 
and providing these [military] institutions with the necess~ 
resources to carry out the duties of national defense." 9 
Bearing these changes in mind, statements by Arias appear 
to demonstrate a clash between his own historical 
perspective, and that of a new Latin American outlook and 
landscape. 
AREAS TO MONITOR 
Regardless of this paradigm shift, and the reassuring 
explanations offered above, Latin America contains its own 
set of "red flags." Venezuela has displayed questionable 
governance and military strategy; individual country security 
considerations demonstrate a vulnerability to old competition 
and disputes between neighbors; and Brazilian 
modernization efforts and plans, while legitimate, hold the 
long-term potential to amass large amounts of military 
equipment. While none of these areas currently portend a 
Latin American arms race, they do hold the potential for one, 
I:iiigo Guevara has warned, and should therefore be closely 
monitored.40 
39 Yopo, Boris, .. t,Carrera Armamentista en la Regi6n?" La Tercera, November 
2"', 2009, <http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895 197084 9.shtml>, accessed 
October 8"', 2010 - -
40 Gu<ovara, lfiigo, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends 
and hnplications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings 
hlstitution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pg. 22 
13 
VENEZUELA: Like the country plans mentioned prior, 
Venezuelan military strategy follows its own individual 
country ratiouale. It is acquiring arms, says Walser, because 
of Hugo Chavez's ideology, his approach to governance, and 
his perceived threat of a U.S. invasion. 41 Robledo sees this 
last area as an "explicit anti-U.S./Colombia strategic 
narrative," including Colombia because of Mr. Chavez's 
claims that a U.S. invasion could come through this 
"ghb . 42 nm onng country. 
However, additional factors are at work, explains The 
Economist; purchases made in 2005-2008 - twenty-four 
Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft, 100,000 Kalashnikov assault 
rifles, and fifty military helicopters from Russia - "may have 
been presented as a show of strength to the imperialists in 
Washington, but it was also designed to shore up support 
from the generals at home." Mr. Chavez wants to maintain 
support from the institution where he has historical ties, the 
magazine conveys. 43 
What concerns Marcos Robledo most about Venezuela is its 
poor ranking in the area of democratic governance and its 
lack of transparency, making it what he calls the region's 
"most complex case."44 (Indeed, as Arias once stated, ''The 
combination of strong armies with weak democracies has 
proved to be harmful in every comer of the planet").45 Some 
41 lbid., Walser, Ray, Pgs. 56 and 61 
42 Robledo, Marcos, .. The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective, •• Power 
Point presentation, Slide 17, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, 
Miemi, Florida, May 25th- 26", 2010 
43 
"Speak Fraternally But Carry a Stick; South Americao Defense," The 
Economist, May 31", 2008 
44 Robledo, Marcos, .. The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective, •• Power 
Point presentation, Slide 17, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, 
Miami, Florida, May 25th - 26"', 2010 
45 Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly: General Debate, New York, 
September 24"', 2009 
14 
assert that Chavez is using weapons as "instruments of social 
control.'M Others, such as former legislator Teodoro 
Petkoff, of Venezuela's newspaper Tal Cual, go further, 
saying, "This isn't a conventional dictatorship... It's an 
authoritarian government with a strong military element that 
doesn't hide its intentions to control society behind a 
democratic favade."47 
As for transparency, many defense purchases are indeed 
known. "Since 2006," says Guevara, ''the Venezuelan armed 
forces have acquired 2 dozen Sukhoi fighter jets that have 
replaced its aging inventory of F-5 and Mirage 50s; [they 
have] acquired 18 Chinese armed jet trainers that effectively 
attend a requirement first laid out by their Air Force in the 
early 1980s; 10 combat helicopters; 8 patrol vessels; and a 
couple of hundred short-range air defense missiles." Other 
purchases - which he lists as tanks, armor, artillery, 
submarines, strategic transport aircraft, tankers, additional 
advance jet fighters, and strategic air defense systems - have 
been discussed, but not yet authenticated. Still, despite 
"overexcitement, exaggeration, and rhetoric," he says, "most 
of Venezuela's conventional acquisitions [have] remained 
under normal historical levels and are replacing or restoring, 
rather than increasing, combat capabilities." 
The greatest concern is that there might possibly be a weekly 
or bi-weekly flight traversing between Caracas and Tehran, 
carrying unidentified materials. However, no one is quite 
sure whether this is happening or not. 48 Similarly, former 
U.S. ambassador Roger Noriega has recently claimed that 
46 Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Tronds and 
Implications of Military Expenditures in South Ametica," Brookings Institution 
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pgs. 56 
47 
"Feeling the Heat; Hugo Chavez's Venezuela," The Economis~ May 15"', 2010 
"Guevara, liligo, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends 
and lmplicatioriB of Military Expenditures io Sooth Ametica," Brookings 
Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pgs. 23 and 
36 
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 Chavez is carrying out a "secret nuclear program;" that Iran 
is helping Venezuela mine its uranium, and that Venezuela is 
providing Iran access to the international financial sector. 
Both activities run contr~ to mandates made by the U.N. 
Security Council, he says. 4 
NEIGHBOR STATES: Beyond Venezuela itself exist the 
sometimes-reactive relationships between Colombia and 
Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, 
among other potential border conflicts. 
Colombia contemplated buying tanks in response to 
Venezuelan purchase proposals (described above) - a move 
that would have indeed been indicative of an arms race - but 
for the time being at least, wisely decided against it. Peru, 
cognizant of Chilean military capacity, nearly did likewise. 
After all, "Chile has just gone through a long-term cycle of 
defense upgrade that has seen its equipment and its forces 
updated to the highest standards in its history," says 
Guevara. Peru halted its planned purchases, however, and 
instead began to advocate for preventative safeguards against 
potential arms races. And "Chile has shown restraint," says 
Guevara, "by acquiring secondhand equipment from NATO 
sources rather than buying brand new weapons and further 
escalating the imbalance." And finally, while Bolivian-
Russian arms negotiations initially caused a panic in 
Paraguay, fears subsided when Bolivia reassured its neighbor 
and strengthened its own transparency efforts. 50 
BRAZIL REVISITED: Brazil accounts for approximately half 
of Latin America's overall defense spending, says Guevara, 
49 Noriega, Roger F., "Chavez's Secret Nuclear Program," Foreign Policy, 
October 5"', 2010, 
<http:/ /www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/201 Oil 0/05/chavez _s _secret_ nuclear _pro 
gram?page=O,O>, accessed October 24", 2010 
50 Gu<ovara, lfiigo, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends 
and hnplications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings 
lostitution Cooference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Trsnscript Pgs. 22- 25 
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making steady observation of Brazilian military activity a 
long-term requisite. While there appears no reason to sound 
any alarms, Brazil is clearly the largest actor in the region. 
"[It] is acquiring a new generation of jet fighters, armor, 
submarines, destroyers, frigates, helicopters, along with the 
capabilities to indigenously produce, service, and support 
them," Guevara explains; "We will [therefore] have to wait 
to see what effects this or its longer term ambitions of 
fielding a two-carrier Navy, a space-based presence, and a 
cyber warfare capability produces in the region."51 
TRANSPARENCY MECHANISMS, UNASUR, AND U.S./LATIN 
AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 
Despite the more concerning areas described above, "States 
in South America, as in all parts of the world, have the 
legitimate right to defend themselves and extend control over 
their territory," says Mark Bromley. ''Nonetheless," he 
continues, "as events in South America have demonstrated in 
recent years, certain acquisitions have the potential to alter 
the balance of power in the region and, if not carried out in 
an open and accountable way, can provoke mistrust and 
instability. What this points to is the need for transparent 
procurement mechanisms that allow for both governments in 
the region and the wider public to see what is being 
purchased and why."52 
Others might suggest putting pressure on arms producers to 
decrease military expenditures, but it probably won't work, 
says Adam Isacson, primarily because there are so many 
producers. "Ten years ago, fifteen years ago," he says, ''the 
United States was not only the largest seller of weapons to 
the region, it accounted for more than half of sales." It now 
accounts for only a third. The U.S. can do its part, he says, 
51 Ibid., Pg. 25 
52 !bid., Bromley, Mark, Pg. 18 
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by abstaining from sales that demonstrate fiscal 
irresponsibility, or sales that look likely to fuel regional 
tensions; but it, too, should "[make] transparency a key 
foreign policy goal," he says, seconding Bromley's 
conclusion. 53 
To achieve greater hemispheric participation in transparency 
mechanisms, however, governments will have to navigate 
the three independently operating regional and international 
systems: 
1. The United Nations Register of Conventional 
Arms. "[It] was established in 1991," explains 
Bromley, "and creates a political commitment for 
all states in the world to share information on 
their imports, exports, and holdings of major 
conventional weapons systems. Now, every state 
in South America has submitted information to 
the UN Register on at least one occasion over the 
last 10 years," he continues. "However, the 
overall number of submissions has fallen in 
recent years to about half of what it was at the 
beginning of the 2000s. Meanwhile, only two 
states in the region - Brazil and Chile - have 
consistently submitted information to the UN 
Register since 1998."54 
2. Organization of American States' Transparency 
Convention (the lnter-American Convention on 
Transparency in Conventional Weapons 
Acquisitions), explains Bromley, which although 
established as early as 1999, has only been signed 
by 20 of the 34 member countries, and ratified by 
just 13.55 
53 Ibid., JBacson, Adam, Pgs. 70 and 71 
54 !bid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 18 and 19 
"Ibid. 
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3. Union of South American Nations' (UNASUR) 
new creation, the South American Defense 
Consulate, which just recently garnered 
commitments from each UNASUR member 
country to share information on spending and 
acquisitions. 56 Robledo sees particular promise in 
UNASUR, even calling for a "U.S.-UNASUR 
security dialogue." At the very least, UNASUR 
should be supported, he says, because "If 
successful, [it] may address [the] most critical 
sub-regional security issues, even concerns about 
Venezuela."57 
Countries may wish to streamline these diverse transparency 
systems, but most important is that they continue to 
participate and effectuate systems of openness, active 
communication, and accountability. 58 While "participating 
in [transparency mechanisms] means yielding some secrecy, 
yielding some sovereignty," concedes Mr. Isacson, "the 
payoff for all of those involved is probably greater."59 
Finally, the United States can do its part by conscientiously 
supporting Latin American countries that take on the 
process. Ideally, this will allow the United States to make 
manifest the broad "equal partners" approach described by 
President Obama at the Sununit of the Americas in Trinidad 
(April2009), and by Mr. Mora days later. As Mr. Mora then 
explained, current U.S. engagement and commitment with 
Latin America should be judged "by how successful the U.S. 
1s m partnering with regional neighbors to build their 
56 !bid. 
57 Robledo, M>lrcos, "The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power 
Point presentation, Slides 29 and 30, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security 
Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25"'- 26", 2010 
"Bromley, Mark, "An Anns Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends 
and hnplicationB of Military Expenditures in Sooth America," Brookings 
lnBtitution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pg. 20 
" Ibid., !sacson, Adam, Pg. 73 
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expertise and competence to provide for their own security 
and the security of the region as a whole."60 Supporting the 
maturation of Latin America's transparency mechanisms is a 
specific opportunity for enacting this approach today. 
60 Mora, Frank 0., "The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defeose Policy Toward the 
Americas," Pgs. 2 and 3, University of Miami, April 29th, 2010 
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APPENDIX I 
Military Expenditure of Latin America's Six Biggest Spenders (1988- 2009) 
Conventlon: US$ m. = Million US dollars; = Data not available or not applicable, () =Uncertain figure. ll = S!PRl estimate. 
th. = thoosand; m. =million; b.= billion. Figures in l:OOB1ant US do1lam and as a ihaie ofGDP are presented by calmda:ryem. 
In constant ( 2008 ) US$ m. 
Brazil 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1M 1997 1991 1999 2000 2001 2000 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
r17,855] U7,673] [12,161] [7,185] [7,450] [10,7991 [12,762]17,747 16,504 16,391 17,618 18,049 19,550 22,531 22,947 18,306 19,021 20,581 21,310 22,983 23,302 27,124 
Chilo 
Year 1988 1989 199(1 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 21106 2007 2008 2009 
Value [2,7:56] [2,442] [2,50!1] [2,585] [2,676] [2,742] [2,773] [2,841] [2,948] [3,209] 3,420 3,623 3,835 3,981 4,246 4,310 4,998 5,364 6,282 6,116 5,982 5,6113 
Nota: (I) The ligures fur Chile include direct tmnsfm from the rts.te-owned. copper oompany Cmporaci6n Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) fur milit:ary purchases. These transfers incmlsed rapidly 
between 2005 and 2008 owing to rising copper prices, than fell in 2009, also al.ang wilh copper priooo. (2) Figures ftt these COIIliiries are fur 1he adopted budget. rather 1han actual expmllinre 
Colombia 
Year 1988 1989 1!190 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1993 1999 2000 1001 2001 2003 1004 2005 2006 1007 2008 2009 
Value [2,293] [2,562] [2,633] [2,237] [2,714] [3,288] [3,143] [3,560] [4,150] 4,731 3,671 3,777 4,766 5,259 5,588 6,.511 6,419 6,643 7,533 7,742 9,076 10,055 
Note: The figures fur Colombia in 2002-2007 illclude special allocations totaling 25 billim peso:& from a war tax decree of12 August 2002, M03t ofthe.~e aUocatiOllll w;;:re ~JXIlt hdweoo 2002-lOO•t 
Ecuador 
Year 1938 1989 199D 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 lDOO 2:001 2002 lfl03 2:004 2005 2006 lfl07 2DD8 21109 
- mu•m•mm~~mrnm~•~rnmrn~-~--
Note: Ecuador changed its cwrem.-y fran the sucre to the US dollan: on 13 Man:b 2000, at &. rete of one doll.ur to 25 000 &UCICII. The current price figuml fur each year repmnmt the 
dollm: w1ue of military expenditure at the m.arket exchange rate for that year. 
Uruguay 
y..,. 1988 .... .... 1991 1092 1993 1 ... 1995 1996 1997 1998 . ... 2000 2001 2002 2003 
-
2005 
-
2007 2008 2009 
Vol"' [584] l636] l611J [471J [626] [487] l720] [441] [422] [417] [4ll6J l420] [352J 404 350 336 326 337 343 351 401 496 
Venezuela 
y.., 1988 1989 1990 1991 ,.., 1993 , ... 1995 , ... 1997 , ... 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 
-
2005 
-
2007 
-
.... 
VoiDe [3,217] [2,973] [3,709] 2,720 2,613 1,887 3,095 2,405 2,089 2,563 2.591 1,903 1,853 2,627 3,548 4,681 3,908 4,329 3,254 
N*-: (1) The figure forVmm:u::la fur 2009 is fur the initial budget. In recent years, V;mezuela's actual military spending hu been eorOOstently and signifu:antlyhigherthan 1he initial budget,. by44% 
in 2006. 15% in 2007 amd 30% in 2008. Figure~ for Venezuela fur 1he yearsl99l-l997 and fur 1he m011t recent year, are for the adupted budget rather than fur the ac1ual expenditure. The figureB fur 
Veoozu.ela do not include suOOtmrtial extm.mbudgetary expenditure ;;m B.rnlll import~~. (2) Thill country cbs.nged or redenonrinated it:n cummcy during the p«i.od; aU current price lor.al Clll'lmcy figures have 
bcm oonverted to the latest &.."U!£ellcy. 
As percentage of gross domestic product 
"' 
"' Brazil 
Year 1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Value [2.1] [2.6] [1.9] [1.2] [1.2] [1.6] [1.6] 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Clille 
Year 19l!ll 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Value [5] [4.2] [4.3] [3.9] [3.7] [3.6] [3.3] [3.1] [3.1] [3.2] 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.5 
Colombia 
Year 1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 1001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1007 2008 
Value [2.4] [2.6] [2.2] [l.B] [2.2] [2.5] [2.3] [2.5] [3] 3.3 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 
Ecuador 
Year 1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Value 2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.4 2 2.1 2.4 l.8 1.7 1.8 2 2.6 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.9 2.8 
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APPENDIX II 
Major Conventional Arms Suppliers to Latin America's Si:< Biggest 
Spenders (2000 - 2009) 
Figures are SlPRI Trend Indicator Valuw (TIVs) expres~~ed in US$ m.II!COlllltlmt (1990)prices. For more informaticn, see 
http:liwww.sipri.org/contexrtafarmstrad/output _types_ TIV .htm1 
Recipient ! Suppliers 
i 
Brazil France (673), USA (329), Sweden (175), Germany (174), Italy and Spain 
(156 each) 
Chile 
Colombia 
i Netherlands (1021), UK (667), Germany (422), USA (396), France (320) 
i 
! USA (795), Spain (113), Russia (103), Israel (90), Bmzil (60) 
I 
Ecuador 1 Chile (135), Spain (33), Israel (32), India (22), Venezuela (17) ' 
urug;;;;y f i'Ortlig&i(63),oem;a;;ya;;;rspiili1(29);R:;;;si;;(6);s;.;;eli•n:<s>.canadl1(4) I 
Venezuela ! Russia (1996), China (122), Netherlands (72),1srael (51), South Korea (45) ! 
Source: SJPRI Arms Transfers Database 
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from contingency operations to global climate change and greenhouse gas reduction to 
safety and occupational health. These solutions increase mission readiness and 
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NDCEE provides project management and technical support to the WHEMSAC 
Program. 
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